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Abstract
Modern airline pilots are tasked every flight with the safe and efficient operation of highly automated airliners in today’s complicated
global and economic environments. Airlines have developed standard operating procedures (SOP) for normal, abnormal, and emergency
operations. These procedures serve as a script for crews to follow. These procedures are designed by airlines to ensure that aircraft are
operated in the (1) most safe, (2) most efficient, and (3) most on-time manner. For the most part pilots will comply with SOP, but when
they (1) don9t agree with SOP, (2) don9t understand SOP or the risks associated with not complying with SOP, or (3) don9t feel adequately
trained to know what SOP is, it is difficult to motivate them to comply. Airlines have the means to measure compliance through Flight
Operations Quality Assurance (FOQA) and Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA). The purpose of this research is to determine if
increased understanding, knowledge and awareness of the risk of noncompliance with SOP increase airline pilots’ compliance with SOP.
This research explores data from line checks at a major US airline that was gathered in pursuit of understanding what drives SOP
compliance. Baseline data was gathered and analyzed to determine the top 12 noncompliant items. The airline provided training during
the Human Factors module in each pilots recurrent training on Pilot Intentional Non Compliance (PINC). The training including
developing pilots’ understanding that while most Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports grant pilots immunity from legal
action, if a violation is labeled PINC, ASAP protections do not apply. Further line checks were conducted after the pilots received the
PINC training. The top 12 noncompliant items from the pre-PINC training group were compared to the same 12 items in the post-PINC
training group. Significant improvement in SOP compliance was found in six of the 12 items tested. The results established that training
pilots on the risk of PINC did significantly increase SOP compliance.
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‘‘Why? Because I said so.’’ For the general population,
these words provide very little motivation to comply with a
request. However, in the black and white world of aviation,
pilots are trained to follow the rules simply because they
are the rules and the rules were made to be followed, and
because the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and
company policies and procedures ‘‘said so.’’
Checklists are completed step by step on every flight.
Procedures for normal, abnormal and emergency operations
are carefully developed and pilots are trained to follow
them precisely. In fact, creative solutions are simply not
allowed unless every other option has failed. In normal
day-to-day line operations, Standard Operating Procedures
(SOP) allow pilots who have never worked together before
to safely operate complex flights. According to Dismukes,
Berman and Loukopoulos (2007), ‘‘these written scripts
establish the correct way to perform procedures and
provide standardization across pilots. Standardization is
crucial’’ (p. 2). Crews of two to four pilots are often
brought together for the first time an hour before departure
time and are expected to work together to provide the most
safe, comfortable and profitable flight possible. Each pilot
has a role and a script, and ideally, if SOP is followed, there
should be very few surprises in normal, abnormal or
emergency operations.
The knowledge of pilots’ compulsion to comply with
rules and regulations leaves airlines struggling to under-
stand why data show that pilots are not dutifully complying
with all SOP. Several recent accidents point directly to
deviation from SOP as a primary cause.
In the fatal crash in Buffalo, New York of Continental
Connection Flight 3701, a Bombardier Q400 that was
operated by Colgan Air, the NSTB found that:
Contributing factors included his [pilot’s] failure to
monitor other warning signals of the plane’s slowing
speed, and violation of ‘sterile cockpit’ rules against
casual conversation at low altitudes. The board also said
Colgan had failed to spell out adequate procedures for
crews to monitor air speed when icing is a risk
(Trumbell, 2010, p. 90).
The wingtip damage of an American Airlines MD-82 on
Flight 1402 was a nonfatal event in Charlotte, North Carolina:
A big question facing investigators is whether American’s
basic operational rules and procedures were followed. If
complications crop up once an aircraft descends below
1,000 feet on an instrument approach, pilots generally are
trained to break off the descent, gain altitude and circle back
for another landing (Paztor, 2009, p. A6).
And, the investigation into the nonfatal crash of Con-
tinental Airlines Flight 1404, a 737-500 in Denver, Colorado,
that departed the runway midfield during takeoff found that:
The captain’s use of the nosewheel steering tiller was
contrary to company procedures and neither of these late
control inputs was an effective method for turning
the airplane at high speed. The NTSB concludes that the
captain’s use of tiller and full right control wheel in the 3
seconds before the excursion likely resulted from acute
stress stemming from a sudden, unexpected threat,
perceived lack of control, and extreme time pressure
(National Transportation Safety Board, 2010, p. 44).
Airlines are responsible to ensure SOP are safe and pilots
understand and can comply with current SOP. The pilot’s
choice to deviate from or disregard SOP creates risk for the
airline, passengers and crewmembers. According to Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs) and Airline Operation
Specifications (Ops Specs), it is the pilot’s obligation to
comply (FAR/AIM 2012). This study explores the reasons
for noncompliance and the effects of specific initiatives
designed by airlines to improve pilots’ compliance with SOP.
Literature Review
SOP are written, published and tested procedures that are
expected to be universally and consistently applied within an
organization. SOP should identify and describe the standard
tasks and duties of a flight crew for each flight phase, including
what to do and when to do it. Also, SOP should be simple,
clear, concise and prescriptive (Aviation Glossary, 2010).
From the early days of ab initio training, modern airline
pilots are trained in the use of checklists and other
procedures defined as SOP. From the moment a crew is
brought together in the flight planning room until post-
flight procedures are completed, a very specific series of
steps are taken to dictate interactions between crew
members. FAR 121.533 states ‘‘the Captain shall operate
in accordance with FARs, Ops Specs [SIC] and airline
procedures and policies except under circumstances
provided for in FAR 121.557 [Captain’s emergency
authority]’’ (FAR/AIM 2012). Furthermore, operating
manuals assign the Captain with the duty of ensuring the
timely completion and accurate adherence to checklist
procedures (Flight Operations Manual, 2011). When the
Ops Specs provide SOP that are simple, clear, concise and
prescriptive it is easy for a pilot to understand how to
comply. However, sometimes SOP are not easy to under-
stand and apply, and that makes compliance difficult
(Dismukes et al., 2007). The overriding rules for airline
operations are made by the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration (FAA), but SOP is carefully developed by each
airline to take the airline beyond safety to improve
efficiencies and reduce surprises in the cockpit. Sukenik
(1998) found that, ‘‘Adhering to SOP leads to a maximum
utility and, thus, to greater flight safety than deviating from
it, even if an alternative procedure is equivalent as far as
safety is concerned or seems to lead to greater utility’’
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(p. 405). The airlines want their pilots to follow SOP because
it has been proven to increase safety and save money.
Beyond the regulations, studies show that SOP should be
adhered to in a pilot’s pursuit of individual safety. Baker (2007)
analyzed the effects of SOP compliance and found that,
‘‘Within an airline, management, operations, maintenance,
training, equipment, and pilots must all be aligned.
Accidents occur when breakdowns arise in the interactions
of these components’’ (p. 186). Simply put, strict adherence
to SOP helps each individual involved with the operation of
a flight know what to expect. Baker’s research showed
clearly that, while SOP are not perfect, compliance with SOP
make airlines safer, and noncompliance can lead to aircraft
incidents and accidents. Furthermore, in analysis of 19 U.S.
airline accidents in the period of 1990-2000, Dismukes, et al.
(2007) found inadequate execution of highly practiced
normal procedures under challenging conditions and devia-
tion from explicit guidance or SOP as two of six common
themes underlying the NTSB’s label ‘‘pilot error’’ as an
accident cause or contributing factor. They felt noncom-
pliance due to lack of understanding or execution of SOP or
blatant disregard for SOP are key problems that airlines must
acknowledge and address in any attempts to increase SOP
compliance.
Advanced Qualification Programs
In 1994 United Airlines Training Center developed the
first Advanced Qualification Program (AQP). Today nearly
all major U.S. airlines, along with growing number of U.S.
regional airlines, participate in this voluntary program. The
purpose of AQP is to encourage the use of innovative
technologies, training and evaluation features to improve
training performance. These programs are systematically
developed, continuously maintained, and empirically
validated as proficiency-based training systems. During
a pilots career, one will experience initial (new-hire),
transition (new airplane type), upgrade (new seat) and
recurrent training. Recurrent training consists of simulator
training to proficiency, crew resource management (CRM)
and human factors (Hughes, 1995). Pilots are trained on the
proper execution of SOP for all phases of flight in normal,
abnormal and emergency operations. Evaluations are
designed to ensure that understanding of SOP is demon-
strated before the pilot is qualified for line operations.
Under AQP guidelines, captains are required to success-
fully pass a line check every 24 months. A line check is an
observation of a pilot during line operations (Klinect,
Helmreich, Murray, & Merritt, 2003). During these line
checks a check airman observes the Captain and assesses
SOP compliance. These line checks are jeopardy events,
meaning the pilot must pass or be removed from line flying
for training to resolve deficient areas. Some of the
Microscope Line Checks (MLC) referred to later in this
study were done during line checks required by AQP.
Line Operations Safety Audit
Besides the AQP required line checks, airlines employ
a safety tool known as Line Operations Safety Audit
(LOSA). These cockpit observations are similar to line
checks as they are gathered during normal flight operations,
but their purpose is different:
In the most general of terms, LOSA is similar to getting
your cholesterol checked during a routine examinatio-
n...it provides a diagnostic snapshot of safety perfor-
mance. It uses cockpit observations collected in normal
operations to provide a profile of safety strengths and
weaknesses. Similarly, the onus is on the airline to
respond to the data and make change if necessary.’’
(Klinect et al., 2003, p. 2).
Learning Theory
Since the purpose of this research is to evaluate
experienced pilots’ compliance with SOP, it is important
to understand how pilots learn following initial training.
While each new learning experience presents challenges of
different degrees, professional pilots are expected to perform
well in all aspects of training. In line operations, pilots are
expected to adopt and comply with company SOP. This
requires pilots to overcome any bias, including any personal
dislike or disagreement with SOP (Dismukes et al., 2007).
Understanding how pilots learn and make decisions is
key to developing training on SOP. SOP is not necessarily
developed to bring pilots to the best choice, based on the
pilot’s experience, but to a prescribed choice. All
procedural changes require the creation or alteration of
SOP and the training for pilots to understand what is now
expected of them. The airlines are very experienced and
very good at making SOP for all areas of operation, and as
new procedures are implemented, a checklist normally
accompanies them (Sukenik, 1998). The concern arises
when the FAA sets the minimums for training require-
ments, and the standards are influenced by cost cut-
ting initiatives. Dismukes et al. (2007) found ‘‘inadequate
knowledge or experience provided by training and/or
guidance’’ (p. 298) was a factor in more than a third of
the 19 accidents studied. A critical component of these
accidents involved pilots who found themselves in
‘‘challenging situations for which they had received
training, but the experience they received from that training
was of inadequate fidelity to the actual situation, inade-
quately detailed, or incomplete’’ (p. 298). In these accidents
the authors discovered the pilots completed the training, but
the airlines’ efforts to ensure that pilots understood SOP to
the point they would be comfortable executing new
procedures simply fell short. The authors go on to explain
that if airlines were more aware of the limitations of their
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training, they could make modifications and train pilots to
make well thought out decisions that utilize SOP based on
their solid understanding of how to apply the new SOP to
real-life situations.
Pinc and Punc
James Huntzinger, the former Vice President of Safety,
Security & Compliance at Korean Air has been credited
with coining the terms procedural intentional noncompli-
ance (PINC) and procedural unintentional noncompliance
(PUNC) (Agur, 2007). Quite simply, these acronyms are
used to label behavior as pilots’ unintentional or intentional
deviation from company prescribed SOP. The Air Safety
Foundation (2007) reported that a review of accidents
involving professionally flown aircraft shows that four out
of five events included PINC or PUNC by pilots.
Additionally, ‘‘PINCs and PUNCs are reduced dramatically
when an effective safety culture exists.’’ (Agur, 2007, p.
13). One might conclude the way to reduce PINCs and
PUNCs is to increase the effective safety culture at an
airline. Simple as that sounds, U.S. major airlines are
already incredibly safe and have effective safety cultures in
place (Snyder, 2007).
It has already been established that airline safety records
are commendable and current regulations motivate opera-
tors to avoid situations where they could be violated by the
FAA, yet PINC events are regular occurences. Huntzinger
(2006) summarized the following:
‘‘PINC events typically involve crews who have been
flying most of their adult lives — veteran aviators who
train on simulators once or twice a year; attend. recurrent
training classes that cover procedures, FARs, limitations
and other best practices; practice CRM; ride with check
airmen; and so on. In short, they clearly know the rules
and regulations, yet...intentionally violate them’’ (p. 42).
Huntzinger describes the three elements of a PINC event
as: (1) a reward for the violator; (2) knowledge of the as-
sociated risk; (3) consideration of how one’s peers will react.
If a pilot is able to determine that, for example, the reward of
an on-time arrival (getting home sooner) is worth the risk of
an unstabilized approach (that by SOP should result in a go-
around) and in their opinion they determine that continuing
the approach and landing would be considered safe enough
by their peers, even if it violates SOP, and even though they
know better, their safe enough landing has all the elements
required for PINC. ‘‘They [PINC] are often the result of well-
meaning pilots trying to do their job but willfully taking risks
to achieve what should be a secondary goal, ‘completing the
mission.’’’ (Agur, 2007, p. 36)
PUNC can be considered a SOP violation that is less
deliberate in nature, but it is the result of a lack of
information or understanding that results in a pilot
unknowingly violating SOP. The pilot’s responsibility is
to comply with company SOP, and the airline is responsible
to train the pilots who operate their aircraft. An effective
airline safety culture strives to inform pilots of ever
evolving SOP, but this is not an easy task. Anthony (2009)
summarizes: ‘‘Aviation is inherently a dynamic and ever-
changing industry that is constantly producing hazards
even as it strives to reduce them’’ (p. 42). The task of
finishing the work of SOP development so that pilots can
be perfectly informed of SOP is never complete, and PUNC
is often the result of a lack of training by the company and
thereby pilot’s efficiency in understanding of SOP.
Research Questions
The purpose of this research is to determine if increased
understanding, knowledge and awareness of the risk of
noncompliance with SOP will increase airline pilots’
compliance with SOP. As their experience grows, their
adversity to high-risk may cause them to avoid troublesome
situations. Often times their intelligence drives them to
make the wisest, most prudent choice as they strive for
safety. A natural extension to understanding pilot person-
alities might be to assume that they enjoy the establishment
of SOP and are excited to follow it to the letter. Quite the
contrary, pilots are not content with the way labor has been
treated in ‘‘the airline industry’s...most volatile period in
the past 20 years’’ (Goodman, 2008, p. 14). This frustration
may serve as a distraction resulting in attention being
diverted from SOP (Dismukes et al., 2007).
Since September 11, 2001, uncertainty has ruled airline
aviation, and when it comes to pushing for compliance,
pilots have a tendency to push back. A quandary is defined
as a state of doubt or uncertainty, especially with regard to
the choice of alternatives (Quinion, 2008). In the case of
PINC, the pilots’ know SOP but choose to ignore it, where
in the case of PUNC the SOP may not be clear or properly
understood. In every case pilots are tasked to comply, even
if they are unsure what a specific SOP compliance requires
or don9t like the SOP. Perhaps this is why pilots find
themselves in a quandary regarding SOP compliance – they
are conflicted. SOPs are developed by airline management
and experienced line pilots in the safety and comfort of an
office. Safety, trainability and what is best for the company
are all factors in how SOPs are determined. Along with
experience and past practice, they consult the manufac-
turer’s airplane flight crew operating manual and other
sources to determine what SOP is best. New initiatives
result in new procedures and it is sometimes difficult for
pilots to keep track of which procedure is the current
procedure, especially when the reason for the change to
SOP is not explained or understood. Pilots may feel that the
SOP prescribed for a given scenario is unsafe, complicated,
or simply unnecessary. Pilots are opposed to change,
especially when the procedure being replaced was, in their
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opinion, was at least as safe, if not more safe than the new
SOP (Dismukes et al., 2007).
Also, because of Captain’s authority, pilots mistakenly
believe their certificate entitles them to disregard SOP if they
have determined that their way is ‘‘more safe.’’ This is true in
the application of ‘recommended practices’, the term applied
to specific techniques trained by the airline. When it comes
to recommendations, pilots can adopt the recommended
technique or develop their own (Aircraft Operating Manual,
2010). For SOP, except in an emergency situation where an
emergency has been declared, failure to comply with SOP is
a violation of the certificate they hold, which requires them
to operate according to company policies and procedures
(FAR/AIM 2012). Therefore, pilots may believe that the
company prescribed way to operate a jet and the absolute
safest way to fly are not equal. In a specific airline’s AQP,
recurrent training time is often limited because the goal is to
meet the minimum requirements and keep costs low.
According to Rigner and Dekker (2000), today’s airlines
are sometimes faced with limited training time available, and
their chosen training approach may not allow instructors to
elaborate where need is shown because of prescribed tasks
that must be accomplished. In other words, there is a lot to
cover in a limited amount of time, which often results in
training deficiencies that may or may not show up in Line
Oriented Flight Training (LOFT) or line checks. Updates to
current procedures are distributed to pilots by bulletins, and
amended SOP are sometimes trained by textual description
alone. Pilots are expected to maintain a firm understanding
on the execution of current SOP, often times without
receiving any training on it. The amount of information and
training provided with changes to SOP may not be adequate.
Several authors state that the lack of understanding of the
implications of disregarding SOP is a factor in a pilot’s
decision to violate SOP. Before FOQA programs, airlines were
largely unaware of the specific configurations their aircraft
were operated by a particular pilot on a given day. With
FOQA, the gatekeeper can link the pilot to flight performance
data through all phases of flight. Another factor is the
protection of the ASAP program, which protects pilots as long
as the violation was unintentional and not in violation of SOP.
Pilots may not have adequate understanding of the con-
sequences of PINC, which include being violated by the FAA
because the immunity of the ASAP programs will not extend
to intentionally risky behavior. The truth is ‘‘they’’ (the
company and FAA) knowwhat pilots are doing on every flight
and the responsibility to comply with SOP is not only required
during line checks. Therefore, pilots may not understand the
risk associated with a decision to disregard SOP. This is a new
change, and once pilots are trained on the risk associated with
noncompliance with SOP, compliance may increase.
The research questions posed by this study are:
1. Do microscope line check findings differ following
instruction on PINC and PUNC as compared to pre-
instruction findings?
2. Do the top 12 ‘‘non-standard’’ items on the micro-
scope line check improve in rank amongst top 12
items following instruction on PINC and PUNC?
Methodology
This research is to determine if increased training of the
risk of noncompliance with SOP will increase airline pilots’
compliance with SOP. To establish a need for further study,
LOSA checks were accomplished at a major U.S. airline
during January of 2010. As a result of the LOSA checks, it
was determined that more emphasis and education were
needed concerning SOP compliance. Microscope line
checks (MLC) were conducted on 308 flights in January
and February of 2010. Check airmen were assigned to
observe on randomly selected routes to collect the data and
complete the checks. These MLC were classified as line
checks, not LOSA, and therefore if a pilot were to fail the
MLC they would be disqualified and sent for training in
accordance with AQP. After the high frequency MLC in
January through February of 2010, the airline elected to
continue using the same survey on all scheduled line
checks required by AQP. Additional data was collected
through March 2011 and is also used in this research. All
data were recorded anonymously and tested against specific
changes to airline training and policies to determine effect
on pilot’s SOP compliance. Finally, the Institutional
Review Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed
and approved the project including the survey questions,
proposed sample, and research methods.
The checks utilized a standardized survey of 60 different
SOP items. The survey items were broken down by phase
of flight. Each phase of flight included any checklists to be
completed, actions to be taken and any other specific SOP
actions required. There was also a section for general SOP
items, for example ‘‘Appearance’’ or ‘‘Point and Shoot used
for all altitude changes’’. Each item was scored either as
‘‘Standard,’’ ‘‘Nonstandard,’’ ‘‘Not Applicable’’ or ‘‘Not
Observed.’’ The check airmen performing the MLC were
asked to record comments on each of the ‘‘Nonstandard’’
items to establish the reason for the discrepancy. To
understand the specifics of each occurrence of noncom-
pliance, the researcher recorded and analyzed the com-
ments from each of the flights conducted in January and
February of 2010. While this qualitative data was not used
to determine any trends of noncompliance, it was used to
determine which specific initiatives and procedural changes
should be tested for potential effect on SOP compliance.
Specific training on the consequences PINC was added to
the Human Factors training module that was presented to
pilots during initial, transition, upgrade and recurrent
training. By August 31, 2010, all participants had completed
this training.
Participants were current and qualified flight crews at a
major U.S. airline. MLC checks were randomly conducted
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on flights in both domestic and international flight operations
during January, February and March. Additional MLC data
was gathered during the next 12 months during AQP
required line checks. With few exceptions, all flight crew
members hold a type rating on the aircraft flown. The check
airmen who conducted the MLC are also type rated, current
and qualified captains on the equipment checked. Parti-
cipants remained anonymous except for the generalized
demographic data queried at the beginning of the survey.
The study author notified and received written permis-
sion from management of the respective airline to utilize
data collected from the survey. The Institutional Review
Board at the University of North Dakota reviewed and
approved the project survey questions, proposed sample,
and research methods.
The one area of concern for bias is the potential for false-
positives on items found to be ‘‘Standard’’ SOP perfor-
mance. The MLC is a testing event, and therefore it is
impossible to know if the pilots exhibited ‘‘standard’’
behavior because they always follow SOP, or if they are
complying with SOP because they are being watched and
face de-qualification if they fail to comply with SOP. It is
unrealistic to expect that pilots will demonstrate the same
behaviors they would if the check airman were truly an
unknown presence. Therefore, any analysis will be limited to
application to SOP compliance with a check airman in the
cockpit, as it is impossible to know if the same compliance
will carry over to line operations (Helmreich, 2003).
Additionally, some of the participants who were checked
during the random MLC used to establish the baseline for
SOP compliance may have attended Human Factors
training prior to their MLC. Statistically, only 14% of line
pilots experienced this training during this period. Because
the MLC were conducted as the company initiative was
launched, no data without this bias existed. The Human
Factors training on PINC would have biased them towards
SOP compliance, so using those numbers as a baseline is
more conservative than to have purely unbiased numbers.
The data were analyzed to determine if the effect on SOP
compliance is significant. The baseline data were analyzed
to determine the top 12 areas of noncompliance. Those data
were ranked and compared with the data collected during
the months after the PINC training was presented to all
pilots to determine what effect it had, if any, on SOP
compliance rates.
The data set was divided into two groups, pre-PINC
training for the data collected in January and February of
2010, and post-PINC training for the data collected after
September 1, 2010. The data from the pre-PINC training
flights were ranked based on the number of ‘non-standard’
events in each of the 60 areas tested. The top 12 areas of
noncompliance from the pre-PINC training group were
analyzed in this study.
The first group of data, labeled pre-PINC training, was
from the period before all subjects experienced the Human
Factors module containing PINC training. These data were
gathered from 306 randomly selected flights. Of the 60
areas tested, the top 12 areas of non-compliance from
January and February 2010 MLC (pre-PINC training) were
ranked in Table 1.
The second group of data, labeled post-PINC training,
was collected during flights that were flown after each line
pilot at the airline had received PINC training during the
last nine months. These data were gathered from 289 flights
during which AQP required line checks were being
accomplished. Of the 60 areas tested in the survey, the
top 12 areas of noncompliance from the September 2010
through March 2011 MLC (post-PINC training) were
analyzed.
Statistical Analysis
The data groups were compared using chi-square
analysis to determine any significant change in compliance
levels between pre-PINC and post-PINC training time
periods.
Data Summary
Of the top 12 noncompliant areas analyzed for relation-
ship, six of the 12 showed increased compliance with the
specific area of SOP. The greatest difference between the
pre-PINC training and post-PINC training groups was in
non-standard appearance.
Results and Discussion
The data show that in six of 12 specific areas studied,
pilots who have been exposed to training on PINC will
perform SOP in a manner that the company will grade
‘‘standard’’ on line checks. In nine areas (n512) there was
Table 1






(n 5 306) (n 5 289)




Appearance (63) 3 12
‘‘Point and Shoot’’ for all altitude
changes (65)
4 7
Before Takeoff checklist (26) 5 3
Before Taxi/Taxi checklist (18) 6 8




After-Landing - Taxi checklist (57) 8 (tie) 11
Parking checklist (61) 10 9
Before Starting Engines checklist (16) 11 2
Cruise Checklist (31) 12 5
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an overall improvement in SOP compliance. In two areas
where the SOP compliance did not improve, the item tested
was a checklist with multiple items, and therefore multiple
places where the non-standard behavior could have been
displayed. Further research into the qualitative section of
the MLC form would be useful to determine the cause of
the ‘‘non-standard’’ grading.
Checklist items accounted for two of the six areas with
significant improvement. In both the Before Taxi/Taxi
Checklist (x2 (1, N 5 591) 5 4.418, p , 0.5) and the After
Landing-Taxi Checklist (x2 (1, N 5 586) 5 7.439, p ,
0.5), pilots who experienced training on PINC were found
to perform better than pilots who had not received PINC
training. This is noteworthy because in the Before Taxi/
Taxi Checklist and After Landing – Taxi Checklist there
are 11 (approximately – depending on fleet type) items on
the checklist, and therefore 11 places to find oneself graded
‘‘non-standard’’ by a check airmen. The specific checklist
items with noted improvement each consist of over 10
individual checks which could each result in noncompli-
ance. Additionally, the Before Taxi/Taxi checklist was
introduced in 2009 in order to achieve fleet standardization.
Before that time, fleets only had Taxi checklists. The
improvement in compliance could also be attributed to
pilots becoming familiar with new procedures during the
recurrent training by the check airmen emphasizing the new
change, something that occurred during the same training
cycle they received their PINC human factors training.
Non-standard descent speed compliance was number two
in the pre-PINC training ‘‘non-standard’’ rankings, and
showed improvement to number six in the post-PINC
training rankings (x2 (1, N 5 577) 5 6.239, p , 0.5). The
reason for this is twofold: first, ‘‘minimum descent speed –
checked’’ is an item on the first section of the Cruise
Checklist. It is a simple entry (cruise mach/aircraft specific
descent speed) called for at a quiet part of the flight (level
off), and the checklist cannot be called ‘‘complete’’ until it is
entered. Second, PINC training specifically addressed
checklist completion. It is interesting to note that the number
12 ‘‘non-standard’’ item in the pre-PINC training rankings
was the Cruise Checklist, which showed no improvement in
SOP compliance in post-PINC training group, and it actually
had one more occurrence of noncompliance in a smaller
number of total flights in the post-PINC training group.
In terms of ranking, the Cruise Checklist (x2 (1, N 5
584) 5 0.131, p . 0.5) had the second worst ‘decline’ in
ranking between the pre-PINC training ranking and the
post- PINC training ranking, rising from 12th worst area of
non-compliance to 5th. ‘‘Minimum Descent Speed –
Checked’’ is on the Cruise Checklist. Further research into
the comments on ‘‘non-standard’’ grades on non-standard
Cruise Checklist, is required to understand the reason for
the ‘‘nonstandard’’ marks.
Non-standard climb speed policy compliance showed
significant improvement from the pre-PINC training group
to the post-PINC training group, yet it still remained the
number one area of noncompliance in the post-PINC
training group (x2(1, N 5 586) 5 5.205, p , 0.5). The
airline introduced the climb speed policy in 2009 in the
interest of minimizing fuel burn and standardizing fleets.
Unlike non-standard descent speed, ‘‘climb speed’’ is not
an item on any checklist. It is supposed to be entered into
the flight management computer during the preflight, and it
is covered under the umbrella of the ‘‘CDU – Checked’’
response on the Before Starting Engines Checklist. Before
the policy was introduced, pilots used a variety of
recommended practices to program their climb speeds
(i.e., flight plan climb speed, transitioning to cruise mach
number), but there was no existing SOP for the entry of a
climb speed. The new climb speed policy was distributed
by pink bulletin as an amendment to the Aircraft Operating
Manual, and at first a reminder was printed out in the
appended messages portion of every flight plan. This
‘‘reminder’’ was removed at some point after the pre-PINC
training group MLCs took place. The Standard Climb
Speeds are currently located in the aircraft operating
manual in the Climb – Cruise – Descent section, something
not normally accessed during normal preflight procedures.
Non-standard takeoff briefing accomplished was unique
as it was the only item in the top-12 non-standard ranking
with an expanded definition of which SOP items check
airmen should be looking for. The description lists ‘‘Taxi
Route, Hot Spots, SID, FM II special procedures, engine
out, terrain considerations (MEA, MSA, Grid MORA),
Transition Altitude, takeoff.’’ The results showed that pilots
who had received PINC training were more compliant with
SOP than the pre-PINC training pilots (x2 (1, N 5 587) 5
5.266, p , 0.5). This validates the researchers belief that
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pursuit of understanding the SOP for a takeoff briefing the
researcher found no place in the Aircraft Operating
Manuals or in the Flight Operations Manual where all
these requirements are listed as SOP. In fact, all that is
included about takeoff briefings in the Aircraft Operating
Manual is a requirement to designate the pilot-flying, brief
rejected takeoff considerations and any other contingencies
(if applicable) (Aircraft Operating Manual, 2010).
Of those listed on the MLC form, standard instrument
departure (SID), engine out, terrain and takeoff are the only
ones that the researcher could find in the governing books
of the airlines SOP. It would be expected that a pilot could
decide that in order to effectively brief terrain considera-
tions, the minimum safe altitude (MSA) should be briefed,
or that it is wise to brief the planned taxi route, but that
would be considered recommended technique, not SOP.
The term ‘‘Hot Spots’’ is not found in any of the manuals,
nor is there any requirement to brief the taxi route.
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines a
hot spot as a location on an airport movement area that has
historically been at high risk for collisions or runway
incursions (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). These
areas are highlighted on airport charts to increase awareness
for pilots and drivers. The qualitative comments from the
pre-PINC training group explain why the ‘‘non-standard’’
mark was given included, ‘‘Captain did not brief ‘hot spots’
along planned taxi routing’’ and ‘‘No taxi route brief.’’ It
seems there might be some confusion in the training
department as to what the official SOP is for the takeoff
briefing. This exemplifies the need for simple, clear,
concise and prescriptive SOP so that everyone, pilots and
airline training departments, understands what is expected
(Aviation Glossary, 2010).
The largest improvement in SOP compliance was found
in nonstandard appearance. (x2 (1, N 5 579) 5 22.169,
p , 0.5). This standardized residual far exceeded 1.96 (z 5
3.2) and the actual p , 0.01. While it is possible to draw
the conclusion that PINC training had an incredible effect
on pilots appearance, it is interesting to also note that the
flight department at this particular airline distributed a letter
to all pilots signed by a majority of the chief pilots
indicating that the culture of uniform compliance is
changing. Another possible contributing factor was a
change in leadership that was accompanied by a less-
restrictive hat and tie policy ‘‘rumor’’. That rumor became
official in a recent revision to the carrier’s flight operations
manual. Analysis of the pre-PINC training data comments
to understand how many were hat and tie related might
reveal fewer non-standard appearance scores if the current
policy were applied to pre-PINC training data. Regardless,
the airline can be satisfied that they met the seemingly
unachievable goal of perfect compliance with SOP in this
one area in the post-PINC training line checks.
Of the remaining items to be discussed, three of them are
checklists that showed no significant difference between
the pre-PINC training and post-PINC training data. In fact,
the non-standard marks on the Before Starting Engines,
Before Takeoff and Parking Checklists all had worse
rankings on the post-PINC training top-12 than on the pre-
PINC training top-12. (x2 (1, N 5 591) 5 1.183, p . 0.5).
The Before Starting Engines Checklist compliance item
was ranked 11th worst pre-PINC training to 2nd worst post-
PINC training, the greatest increase in rank of all items. The
researcher believes that due to the large number of items on a
checklist, it is easy to find something non-standard which
would deem the entire checklist non-standard. On one fleet,
the Parking Checklist’s non-standard comments involved six
different checklist items, three of which were only marked
non-standard on a single flight. (x2 (1, N 5 587) 5 2.905,
p ..05).
It is important to study further the source of these non-
standard marks and determine which areas can be focused
on to improve pilot’s understanding of SOP on normal
checklists. The final item for discussion is item 12, non-
standard (G)FMS route/legs verification check. Regarding
item 12, the SOP for this is not new (x2 (1, N 5 589) 5
0.015, p . 0.5). This item’s ranking moved from 8th least
compliant area to 4th least compliant, the third worst
decline in rank. The researcher found the SOP for this item
to be fairly consistent in all fleets, with variations in the
types of (G)FMS the only reason for between-fleet
differences. The interesting finding about this data was
that of the 30 flights found non-standard, 25 of them
(83.33%) were flown on domestic routes. A possible
explanation for this finding is that international routes are
complex and often flown over areas without reliable ground
based navigational aids or radar coverage, the flight plan is
checked against the (G)FMS for accuracy many times.
Domestic flights are almost always in radar coverage,
routes are familiar, and while the chance for violation is just
as prevalent as it is on international routes, the fear of a
gross navigational error fine simply doesn9t exist. This
theory could be researched further to understand if there is
a significant difference in (G)FMS route/legs check
compliance between domestic and international flights
and, if so, explore the comments to further understand
potential solutions to increase domestic pilots awareness of
how to comply and the risk of noncompliance.
Recommendations
Due to the significant findings of improvement in the
post-PINC training group in six of the 12 areas tested, this
researcher feels that PINC training should continue to be a
part of human factors training. Additionally, the airline
should continue to look for new ways to increase pilot’s
understanding of the consequences of choosing to disregard
SOP. As of September 1, 2010, Captain’s decision making
training was added to the PINC training. However, in order
to increase the safety culture the airline should provide
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assertiveness training to the First Officers. This training
should involve both Captains and First Officers with the
goal of establishing roles and expectations. First Officers
must respect the role of the Captain while helping the
Captain comply with SOP, and alerting the Captain to any
deviation from SOP is part of that. This training has the
potential to bring the CRM aspect of SOP full circle and
this step is vitally necessary in pursuit of a more SOP
compliant operation and improvement in the overall safety
culture of the airline.
To simplify SOP compliance, a Quick Reference Card
specific to each fleet should be developed. In the case of
Climb Speed compliance, the card would serve to make
complicated Climb Speed tables easily available for pilots
to crosscheck every flight. This card could be used as a tool
to help pilots comply with all items required on the Takeoff
briefing. This tool should also include similar lists for Crew
Change briefings for 3- or 4-pilot crews and for the
Approach briefing called for on the Descent Checklist.
Aircraft limitations as well as other recommendations from
line pilots could be added as well. Research into the causes
of non-standard procedure compliance in the MLC
comments section could reveal additional items to include
on the Quick Reference Card. The card should be
administered not as a recommended tool, but as SOP for
all crewmembers to reference the card, at least in the case
of multiple item briefings.
Because six of the top-12 areas of noncompliance were
checklist related, a renewed focus on checklist discipline
would be recommended to improve checklist SOP. There
were a number of ‘‘no ‘checklist complete’ call out’’ and
‘‘incorrect response to a couple of items’’ qualitative
remarks on all the checklists that made the top-12.
Checklist discipline is something that some pilots make a
daily practice of, while others make sure they brush up on it
for whenever they need to go to training. If the pilots are
encouraged in training to make line operations checklist
discipline just as stringent as it is in training, the culture
could shift quickly to be more SOP compliant. First
Officers should feel compelled to correct their Captains if
they say, ‘‘Set’’ when they should say, ‘‘Checked,’’ for
example, and Captains should correct First Officers on
incorrect responses to challenge and response items when
they are the pilot monitoring (PM). The responsibility for
good checklist discipline falls on both Captains and First
Officers, and the one holding the card and reading the
checklist has all the answers in hand.
One of the biggest challenges for many U.S. major
airlines is that they essentially operate two different
airlines, one domestic and one international. They have
short-haul and long-haul flights and a variety of fleets
enlisted to accomplish the goal of safely moving people. In
the goal of standardization, these differences cannot be
ignored. Nonstandard (G)FMS route/legs verification
check, brought to light a difference between compliance
rates domestic and international flights. If it is the airlines
plan to standardize fleets in this operating area, it is
important that this procedure is highlighted and the reason
behind checking the paper flight plan with the electronic
flight plan is brought to light. Pilots are frustrated when
they are asked to do something because it is SOP,
especially when it seems to be excessively redundant for
routes they routinely fly. There are many reasons why this
route/legs check is important, and the application of this
procedure to domestic flights makes sense because there is
a potential for mistakes if the procedure is not conducted
properly. The skies are getting more populated, and ATC
separation requirements are shrinking. Educating pilots on
the ‘‘how?’’ and ‘‘why?’’ of a procedure that they may have
deemed unnecessary could shift their thinking.
The final recommendation of the researcher is in all
development of training and new SOPs, differences
between fleets and pilot’s aversion to change must be
acknowledged and addressed to effectively increase SOP
compliance.
Conclusion
The question as to whether increased understanding,
knowledge and awareness of individual airline SOP and the
risk of noncompliance with SOP increase airline pilot’s
compliance with SOP has been only partially explored by
this research project, and further research is required to
more fully answer the question. Because the data was
collected on multiple fleets in both domestic and interna-
tional operations on long-haul and short-haul flights,
further investigation comparing data in these groups could
lead to better understanding of specific areas where SOP
compliance rates may differ. This research could serve to
better explain the conditions under which greater rates of
noncompliance exist in certain operations, thereby allowing
training to be designed to directly address the problem area.
This would help to avoid blanket solutions that, applied
company wide, are often rejected by the groups not
exhibiting the noncompliant behavior. Additionally, the
airline should consider a study of their current checklist
procedures to determine if there is any room for im-
provement or change.
It is also recommended that the airline use future data to
understand the effect of non-training events on SOP
compliance. The PINC training that pilots received that
was tested for this research project was an example of an
external motivator for compliance. If pilots don9t comply
with SOP, they risk being violated. This external motivator,
while shown by this study to be effective, is defined as a
negative motivator. The U.S. Navy publishes this about the
use of negative motivation on subordinates: ‘‘Fear activates
such negative incentives as threat of punishment or
restriction of personal needs. Negative motivation, how-
ever, often destroys morale; and effectiveness will decline
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as morale declines. Long-term or frequent use of negative
motivation is self-defeating’’ (U.S. Navy, 2010, p 4-17).
Future research into the effects of positive external
motivators like improved working conditions due to settled
union labor disputes, positive corporate financial reports,
and the announcement of growth with new airplanes, route,
or hiring of new pilots should be conducted. This research
could reveal if improved morale and the possible effect of a
less distracted cockpit environment could lead to an
increase in SOP compliance. Data gathered during times
of expansion could compare new Captains to Captains who
have been in the left seat for five years or more to
determine who is more SOP compliant. These and many
other questions could be analyzed to better understand what
motivates pilots to comply with SOP.
Due human error, it is not possible for airlines to ever
achieve 100% compliance with SOP, no matter how much
training, clarification and understanding pilots have of
existing SOP. Pilots will make mistakes, but the
determination to pursue perfect SOP compliance should
be a part of a pilot’s commitment to professionalism just
as primum nil nocere, ‘‘first, do no harm,’’ is a funda-
mental part of physician’s ethics training in medical
school. It is an attitude of excellence, a foundation that
serves to underlie the best, most safe operation every time
pilots are charged with the command of an aircraft full of
trusting passengers.
The amount of man-machine interaction required in the
operation of highly automated aircraft flown by airlines
today is negligible when compared to the virtually non-
automated 707 or even the 727. This has reduced the need
for pilots to ‘do’ and increased the need for pilots to
‘monitor’. Bhana (2010) states, ‘‘The paradigm shift is
significant, as it requires a different pilot skill set to be
added to the traditional ‘stick and rudder’ skills’’ (p. 14).
Couple this threat of complacency with FOQA and the
threat of PINC and PUNC, and it is vividly apparent that
today’s airline pilots are operating in a different world in
2012 than they were even 5 years ago, and it is drastically
different from the environment 15 to 35 years ago when
most of today’s U.S. major airline pilots learned to fly.
Acknowledgement of that change requires understanding of
the implications that accompany FOQA, PINC, PUNC and
automation, bringing to light the fundamental need for SOP
compliance.
Aristotle once said, ‘‘Excellence is an art won by training
and habituation. We do not act rightly because we have
virtue or excellence, but we rather have those because we
have acted rightly. We are what we repeatedly do. Ex-
cellence, then, is not an act but a habit’’ (n.d.). John Hale,
the Vice President of Flight at American Airlines has been
credited with coining the phrase ‘aggressively safe.’ In his
introduction to the Flight Operations Manual he states,
‘‘We just do not have the luxury of being anything but
excellent every single time we climb into the cockpit’’
(Hale, 2011). Aggressively safe is an attitude he asks his
pilots to adopt every time they fly, a proactive approach to
flying in pursuit of preparation for the unknown threats that
absolutely exist. He believes that, like in defensive driving,
we must pursue safety throughout all phases of flight
because the threat of complacency is real. SOP compliance
is the foundation to aggressively safe operations.
If airlines can provide pilots with SOP that are simple,
clear, concise and prescriptive and provide pilots with the
training to understand the reason for SOP and how to
successfully apply it and tools to make compliance easy,
they will have done their part. This research established that
training on the ‘‘why’’ behind the ‘‘because I said so’’ that
is the risk of PINC did increase SOP compliance. While
SOP compliance is the goal, if pilots receive training,
clarification and achieve understanding of the ‘why?’ and
‘how?’ of SOP, they will be far more motivated to do the
right thing. ‘‘Because I said so,’’ works, but ‘‘because it is
the right thing to do,’’ changes the motivation from fear to
one where the satisfaction of complying with SOP because
they understand and can justify it as the right thing to do
positively motivates pilots and engages them as profes-
sionals to be an important contributor to the airline’s safety
culture.
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